Productive entrepreneurship and the effectiveness of insolvency legislation: a cross-country study by Kun Fu (1384491) et al.
Productive entrepreneurship and the effectiveness
of insolvency legislation: a cross-country study
Kun Fu & Karl Wennberg & Björn Falkenhall
Accepted: 7 October 2017
# The Author(s) 2018
Abstract This paper studies the association between
the effectiveness of insolvency regulations and entrepre-
neurship using multilevel modeling of about 300,000
individuals in 27 countries over the 2005–2010 period.
We investigate the relationship between three different
measures of Bresolving insolvency^ (time, cost, and
recovery rate) from the World Bank and four different
measures of entrepreneurship from the Global Entrepre-
neurship Monitor, controlling for relevant individual-
and country-level facets. We find that opportunity-
driven and innovation-oriented entrepreneurs are more
severely affected by onerous insolvency regulations
than necessity-motivated entrepreneurs. However, en-
trepreneurs envisioning rapid employment growth are
not affected by onerous insolvency regulations. We
discuss contributions to comparative entrepreneurship
research and public policy.
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1 Introduction
A sizable literature in political economics and law has
focused on the importance of a Bfresh start^ for entre-
preneurs who find themselves in financial insolvency
(Hallinan 1986). Encouraging personal risk taking and
entrepreneurship are imperative requirements for mod-
ern economic systems since the most productive types
of entrepreneurship often involve joint ownership and
labor input from founder entrepreneurs (Gennaioli et al.
2013; Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979).
According to Michelle White, international authority
in the fields of insolvency law and political economies,
Bresearch shows that potential entrepreneurs are strong-
ly affected by changes in the risk of bankruptcy^ (White
2001, pp. 19–20). Further, addressing public policy
attempts to promote entrepreneurship and economic
growth in the midst of the global financial crisis, The
Economist (2010) reported the following:
Making it easier to close a business may not sound
as inviting as announcing yet another Benterprise
fund^ or Binnovation initiative,^ but it is more
vital to reviving the world’s moribund economy.
In the short run, enlightened bankruptcy laws
reduce unemployment by keeping viable compa-
nies alive. In the long run they boost rates of
entrepreneurship. The best way to get more people
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to start businesses is tomake it easier to wind them
up. (The Economist 2010, p. 68).
However, more lenient insolvency laws making it
easier to close down a business may not be solely
advantageous to societies. Insolvency laws that are too
lenient could lead creditors to react negatively by raising
the costs of interest and/or access to financing for small
firms, which may negatively affect small firms’ access
to credit. Consequently, growth-friendly insolvency leg-
islation often tries to strike a balance between not ex-
clusively favoring the small firm creditors (Gratzer and
Sjögren 1999) and not encouraging Bexcess entry^
among unproductive entrepreneurs (Camerer and
Lovallo 1999).
The overall goals of insolvency legislation are mul-
tifold: on the one hand, insolvency rules and legislation
are meant to protect asset owners’ claims to assets
produced or controlled by the firm (e.g., firm share-
holders, suppliers, debtholders, tax authorities). Recent
reforms to insolvency rules, such as the U.S. Chapter 11
legislation, the comprehensive Japanese bankruptcy re-
form in 2003, and the Swedish 2010 bankruptcy legis-
lation, are often designed to weed out bankrupt firms
deemed unproductive when re-organization is not likely
to result in increased project; however, these reform do
encourage the re-organization and re-initiation of firms
deemed likely to become profitable in the near future.
The potential to Brecycle^ resources from bankrupt-
cies—be it fixed assets in the firm or entrepreneurs’
and employees’ human capital—is imperative for soci-
ety to recoup investments (Lee et al. 2007; Peng et al.
2010; White 2001) and for entrepreneurs to learn from
their mistakes (Jenkins et al. 2014; Wennberg et al.
2010).
Not all bankrupt firms are necessarily declared insol-
vent. A substantial number of bankruptcies are initiated
by entrepreneurs themselves, whereas other entrepre-
neurs choose to sell off remaining assets, pay their debts,
and liquidate their firm when facing insolvency perhaps
to avoid the Bstigma^ of insolvency (Thorburn 2000).
Calls for a firm to be declared bankrupt may also be
initiated by other asset claimants, such as suppliers or
debtholders.
Even if entrepreneurs in young firms strive to pursue
profitability, erratic performance is common: initial high
performance can quickly turn into losses or insolvency
because young firms generally have few reserves to
withstand sudden environmental shifts (Cooper et al.
1994). Further, growing firms create many beneficial
societal spillovers in terms of new products and ser-
vices, job creation, and tax payments. Small firms that
remain unprofitable, however, often do not create these
beneficial spillovers, instead leading to low earnings for
the entrepreneur, limited job creation, and reduced tax
payments. Thus, from a theoretical perspective,
policymakers should balance encouraging unprofitable
firms to exit with encouraging profitable businesses to
grow.
Whether insolvency laws and regulations are too
lenient or too harsh is an empirical question. A number
of cross-country studies have investigated correlations
between bankruptcy procedures and aggregate-level en-
trepreneurship, often measured as self-employment or
firm-formation rates (e.g., Armour and Cumming 2008;
Lee et al. 2011). Some single-country studies have
shown that specific changes in bankruptcy laws may
impact entrepreneurs’ entry decisions (Dewaelheyns
and Van Hulle 2008). In particular, a recent quasi-
natural experimental study by Eberhart et al. (2016)
investigated a reform in Japan to change insolvency
laws to reduce the consequences of closing a firm. The
authors found that the proportion of firms declaring
bankruptcy increased following the reform, especially
for firms founded by Belite entrepreneurs.^ Further and
importantly, Eberhart et al. (2016) also found that the
average performance of new firms increased after the
reform as these elite entrepreneurs were more likely to
found higher-performing firms.
To date, however, there is a scarcity of research
investigating the relationship between insolvency legis-
lation and the various types of entrepreneurship despite
the theoretically salient distinction between self-
employment and other forms of entrepreneurship. One
exception is the recent study by Estrin et al. (2016),
which distinguished between entrepreneurs in general
and entrepreneurs with aspirations to create more than 5,
10, or 20 jobs within 5 years. They investigated different
dimensions of both personal and corporate bankruptcy
law and found that the latter does not have any impact
on low-aspiration entrepreneurs. For corporate bank-
ruptcy law, limitations in bankruptcy proceedings re-
garding entrepreneurs’ control over their firm, such as
an automatic stay on secured assets and mandatory
removal of management, reduced the likelihood of in-
dividuals’ entering high-aspiration entrepreneurship.
In this paper, we provide a new comparative study on
the association between insolvency regulations and
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entrepreneurship using recent high-quality data on about
300,000 individuals in 27 countries over a 7-year period.
It is worth noting that we focus on the effectiveness of
insolvency regulations rather than the legislation per se
as the actual impact of these regulations can be affected
by the rule of law—that is, how they will be enforced in
a country. Specifically, we use multilevel modeling to
investigate the relationship between three different mea-
sures of Bresolving insolvency^ (time, cost, and recovery
rate) from theWorld Bank (2004–2009) and four different
measures of entrepreneurship from the Global Entrepre-
neurship Monitor (GEM), controlling for relevant
individual- and country-level facets. These measures al-
low us to categorize individuals’ entrepreneurial activities
as either Bproductive entrepreneurship^—measured as
opportunity-, innovation-, or growth-driven entrepreneur-
ship—and Bunproductive entrepreneurship^—measured
as necessity-driven entrepreneurship. Distinguishing be-
tween necessity entrepreneurship, which mostly leads to
self-employment, and entrepreneurship based on innova-
tive ideas, perceived attractive business opportunities, and
a growth orientation is important since necessity entrepre-
neurship has been found to be negatively correlated with
economic growth (e.g., Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014).
Rather, there is a positive relationship between entrepre-
neurship and economic growth only for a subset of firms,
specifically those that are innovative and growth oriented
(Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014; Shane 2009).
We find that entrepreneurial entry is affected by
corporate insolvency regulations but that the exact
impact differs depending on the measures of insol-
vency regulations chosen and the type of entrepre-
neurship considered. Specifically, insolvency time
and insolvency cost (percentage of estate) are, as
expected, negatively related to individuals’ likeli-
hood of engaging in opportunity-driven, necessity-
driven, and innovative entrepreneurship. Conversely,
but again as expected, insolvency recovery rate has
a positive effect on the same types of individual-
level entrepreneurial activities. Further, we find that
opportunity-driven and innovation-oriented entre-
preneurs are more severely affected by onerous in-
solvency regulations than necessity-motivated entre-
preneurs. However, entrepreneurs envisioning rapid
employment growth are not negatively affected by
onerous insolvency regulations, a puzzle that we
speculate on in the discussion section. Overall, our
analyses show that less stringent insolvency legisla-
tion may indeed stimulate entrepreneurship but to a
different extent depending on the type of entrepre-
neurship. We discuss implications for comparative
entrepreneurship research and public policy.
2 Theory and hypotheses
The theoretical framework of our paper is inspired by an
Austrian economic model of entrepreneurship that iden-
tifies the historically and culturally determined framework
conditions affecting entrepreneurship and the idiosyncrat-
ic prior experience of enterprising—and potentially enter-
prising—individuals (Shane and Venkataraman 2000).
By framework conditions, we mean the general con-
ditions defining the context in which entrepreneurship
occurs. Examples of such conditions are the stock of
knowledge, financial and human capital in the economy,
institutions, history, and prevailing culture. Such condi-
tions determine what opportunities entrepreneurs will
identify and how they will exploit them (Baumol and
Strom 2007). Opportunity exploitation is defined by
three characteristics: (1) the ability to discover versus
the ability to exploit; (2) the entrepreneur’s opportunity
cost; and (3) the uncertainty of the outcome, risk, and
information asymmetry (Shane and Eckhardt 2003).
On the individual level, entrepreneurial actions are
regulated by individuals’ evaluation of first-person fea-
sibility and desirability considerations (e.g., McMullen
and Shepherd 2006). That is, an entrepreneur does not
know in advance whether exploiting an opportunity will
be profitable or not. The accuracy of his or her confi-
dence regarding the value of an opportunity can only be
tested on the market. Since opportunity exploitation is
characterized by uncertainty (Knight 1921), those that
become entrepreneurs have to handle this uncertainty.
Feasibility denotes individuals’ perceived ability to ex-
ecute a target behavior—namely, the degree to which
they feel capable of becoming an entrepreneur (Krueger
et al. 2000). Desirability refers the degree to which one
finds the prospect of becoming an entrepreneur
to be attractive; Bit reflects one’s affect toward
entrepreneurship^ (Krueger 1993, p. 8) and depends
on an individual’s values, which in turn stem from
her or his institutional environment (Shapero and
Sokol 1982).
Theoretically, variation in the cost of insolvency
procedures will likely influence a given individual’s
reaction toward entrepreneurial entry, success, and fail-
ure. By regulating the economic and social tradeoffs
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associated with alternative courses of action, as ob-
served by the entrepreneur, institutions influence the
first-person feasibility and desirability considerations
of potential entrepreneurs (McMullen and Shepherd
2006). Specifically, efficient insolvency procedures,
such as well-functioning bankruptcy laws, provide en-
trepreneurs with Binsurance,^ enabling them to clear
their debts instead of being liable until they are paid
off. Such procedures limit the downside risk of failure if
the entrepreneurs’ business is incorporated (Posner
1973). However, the relative risk of entering entrepre-
neurship can never be insured against but comes in the
form of genuine uncertainty.
Acs and Audretsch provided an economic explana-
tion for the relationship between entrepreneurship, soci-
etal institutions, and uncertainty based on an agency cost
perspective (e.g., Acs 2002; Acs and Audretsch 1987;
Audretsch and Acs 2003; Audretsch et al. 2001). They
argued that in the absence of perfect markets with per-
fect information, markets are characterized by uncer-
tainty and substantial information asymmetries, both of
which make the creation of new independent firms the
best way to process the information needed to determine
the value of new opportunities. Because of incumbent
firms’ bureaucratic organization and decision making,
information asymmetry leads to different agency prob-
lems, for example, problems related to creating incen-
tive structures, monitoring employees, and handling
transaction costs (Wiggins 1991). These agency prob-
lems, in combination with information asymmetries,
often incentivize entrepreneurs to pursue their own op-
portunity by starting a new independent firm.
The degree to which incumbent firms face such
agency problems with respect to new knowledge and
potentially valuable opportunities varies across indus-
tries and regions because the underlying knowledge
conditions differ in these contexts. In some industries,
new knowledge-generating and innovative activities are
relatively more frequent and can be processed within
incumbent firms’ context and structure. In other
industries, innovations and new opportunities often
originate from knowledge that is not routine in nature
and is thus discarded more often by incumbent firms.
Nelson and Winter (1982) called these industry differ-
ences the Btechnological regime^ of the industry. They
argued that the choice of exploitation mode in an indus-
try is based on (1) the nature of benefits and costs
weighted by the incumbent firms that will decide to
exploit or not exploit a new opportunity, (2) the manner
in which consumers or regulatory preferences and rules
influence what is profitable, and (3) the relationship
between profit and the ways incumbent firms learn what
is and what is not a valuable opportunity.
Our paper incorporates both an individual-level com-
ponent (as the level of analysis is individual entrepre-
neurs’ entry decisions) and a national-level component
(variation in expected costs of insolvency procedures at
the national level) (Kim et al. 2016). Insolvency laws
represent one of several institutional mechanisms affect-
ing the likelihood that individuals will act on perceived
opportunities. Research has shown that individuals’
propensity to start new ventures is affected by specific
features of economic policy, such as taxes, interest rates,
judicial efficiency, or insolvency laws (Armour and
Cumming 2008; Braunerhjelm and Eklund 2014).
While taxes and interest rates mainly affect the profit-
ability of entrepreneurship, insolvency laws represent a
crucial aspect of the tradeoffs for individuals consider-
ing starting a business or not. From a societal perspec-
tive, the goal of insolvency regimes is to maximize the
value of assets subject to the insolvency regime (Cepec
et al. 2016; Hart 2000). However, insolvency laws can
be regarded as a barrier to both entry and exit (Lee et al.
2007, 2011). For example, insolvency laws that reduce
the cost of entrepreneurial exit may increase the level of
entrepreneurship in a country (Lee et al. 2007;
Wennberg et al. 2010). The reason behind this increase
is that possible future losses, or the downside, are more
likely to be a prominent factor in individuals’ start-up
decisions than the possible future upside because losses
may come sooner and are easier to calculate (Dew et al.
2009). Losing personal assets can be a major factor
when assessing the degree of risk associated with
entrepreneurial-entry decisions (Estrin et al. 2016).
To date, empirical studies on this topic remain scarce
and have largely been limited to cross-sectional studies
of country-level rates of entrepreneurship. A few of
these studies have shown a positive relationship be-
tween more lenient bankruptcy or insolvency
procedures and different measures of entrepreneurship.
For example, Armour and Cummings (2008) dealt with
the impact of personal insolvency laws on self-employ-
ment, while Lee et al. (2011) focused on the impact of
corporate insolvency laws on new firm entry rates.
Further, Estrin et al. (2016) found that both personal
and corporate bankruptcy laws affect entrepreneurs.
While personal bankruptcy laws influence a broad range
of entrepreneurs, corporate bankruptcy laws is likely to
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impact ambitious entrepreneurs more directly since they
tend to form limited liability corporations (Astebro and
Tåg 2015). Insolvency regulations relaxing constraints
on the supply of funds will enhance entrepreneurial
activity (Parker 2005). Thus, dimensions of corporate
insolvency regulations that enhance the return of debt if
failure occurs, such as time, cost, and recovery rate, will
have an impact on the likelihood of entrepreneurial
entry. Since insolvency laws are intimately tied to down-
side risk of starting and potentially failing with a new
enterprise, we derive an overall prediction followed by
three specific hypotheses related to the three different
types of entrepreneurship investigated:
H1: Onerous (lenient) corporate insolvency
relegations are negatively (positively) associated with
individuals’ likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship.
H1a: Insolvency time is negatively associated with
individuals’ likelihood of engaging in entrepre-
neurship such that the more the time, the lower
the likelihood individuals will engage in entrepre-
neurial activity.
H1b: Insolvency cost is negatively associated with
individuals’ likelihood of engaging in entrepre-
neurship such that the higher the cost, the lower
the likelihood individuals will engage in entrepre-
neurial activity.
H1c: Insolvency recovery rate is positively asso-
ciated with individuals’ likelihood of engaging in
entrepreneurship such that the higher the recovery
rate, the higher the likelihood individuals will
engage in entrepreneurial activity.
2.1 Insolvency legislation, risk, and productive
entrepreneurship
The benefits of entrepreneurship to society depend on
whether the entrepreneurial efforts initiated generate
positive spillovers (Acs et al. 2009). Innovation-
oriented and opportunity-driven entrepreneurship are
initiated by entrepreneurs seeking to turn new ideas into
marketable products and services (Low and Weiler
2012). Such innovative entrepreneurs are often distin-
guishable from other entrepreneurs by their willingness
to search and create new economic opportunities in the
face of uncertainty and risk (Koellinger 2008;
Wennekers and Thurik 1999). Our second string of
arguments posits that for such innovation- and
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, the negative ef-
fects of onerous insolvency regulations will be stronger
than they are for entrepreneurship in general.
Prior studies have indicated that potential entrepre-
neurs are strongly affected by changes in the risk of
bankruptcy (White 2001), and studies of US state prac-
tices have indicated that more lenient insolvency laws
affect perceptions of risk (Fan and White 2003). We
build on the contribution from Eberhart et al. (2016),
who recognized the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs, and
distinguish between elite individuals and non-elite indi-
viduals.1 Elite individuals have higher bankruptcy costs
since they are likely to have more personal assets. Sim-
ilarly, elites have higher opportunity costs and are likely
to have more attractive career options, such as employ-
ment in established firms or opportunities to start other
firms (Eesley and Roberts 2012). Thus, it can be argued
that elite, or opportunity-driven entrepreneurs, will more
accurately assess perceived risk and weigh it against the
potential returns of starting a firm. Eberhart et al. (2016)
also showed that lenient insolvency laws disproportion-
ately affect firm formation by elite individuals compared
with non-elites. The former individuals are more likely
to form high-growth ventures (i.e., they are productive
entrepreneurs), and while the potential returns and prof-
itability from entrepreneurship will increase with firm
growth, growing a firm also increases the risk of firm
failure (Delmar et al. 2013). Elite entrepreneurs are also
more likely to rely on debt to achieve growth and to
form limited liability companies to obtain greater pro-
tection from bankruptcy (Vanacker and Manigart 2010).
Innovation- and opportunity-driven entrepreneurs thus
face increased exposure to onerous insolvency regula-
tions since such regulations will directly affect the risk
involved with introducing novel market offerings (York
and Venkataraman 2010). Since corporate insolvency
laws disproportionately affect innovation- and
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship by increasing the
downside risk of starting and potentially failing with a
new enterprise, we formulate a second prediction
followed by three specific hypotheses related to the
three different types of entrepreneurship investigated:
H2: These negative (positive) effects of insolvency
legislation are stronger for productive entrepreneurship
than for unproductive entrepreneurship.
1 The authors define Belite entrepreneurs^ as individuals who are
particularly likely to succeed since they have better access to resources
via superior human and social capital compared to non-elites.
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H2a: The negative effect of insolvency time is
stronger for opportunity-, innovation-, and
growth-driven entrepreneurship than it is for
necessity-driven entrepreneurship.
H2b: The negative effect of insolvency cost is
stronger for opportunity-, innovation-, and
growth-driven entrepreneurship than it is for
necessity-driven entrepreneurship.
H2c: The positive effect of insolvency recovery
rate is stronger for opportunity-, innovation-,
and growth-driven entrepreneurship than it is for
necessity-driven entrepreneurship.
3 Methods and data
Using our theoretical framework, we seek to study the
relationship between country-level measures of resolv-
ing insolvency and individuals’ likelihood of undertak-
ing the four types of entrepreneurial activity outlined
above. The World Bank started collecting data on re-
solving insolvency in 2004, and we have access to the
GEM data up to 2010. Thus, we analyzed survey data
from a total of 27 countries that were included in the
World Bank’s insolvency data and the GEM’s micro-
level entrepreneurship data. Since not all countries par-
ticipated in the GEM survey in all years, we included all
countries that had participated at least once during this
period. Including all countries also ensured that the
number of country-level observations was adequate for
a multilevel study with three country-level predictors
and two country-level controls. Overall, the total sample
includes 291,424 observations and 23,597 individual-
year observations from 27 countries.
3.1 Dependent variables
Consistent with our theoretical focus, our dependent
variable measured individuals’ entry. We followed sim-
ilar studies identifying four types of entrepreneurship in
the GEM data (Acs et al. 2008; Autio et al. 2013): (1)
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, characterized by
individuals who take advantage of a business opportu-
nity; (2) necessity-driven entrepreneurship, character-
ized by individuals who have no better options for work
other than starting their own business; (3) innovation-
oriented entrepreneurship, characterized by individuals
who introduce new products to the market; and (4)
growth-oriented entrepreneurship, characterized by in-
dividuals who aspire to grow their business. Following
standard procedures, all outcomes were defined as the
percentage of the working-age population (18–64 years
old) who has claimed a business mentioned above in the
current year of the GEM survey (i.e., number of certain
types of entrepreneurship per 100 working-age individ-
uals in the population (see, e.g., Reynolds et al. 2003).
3.2 Independent variables
Our resolving insolvency measures come from the
World Bank (2004–2010) and are described in detail
by Hart et al. (2008). We used three different proxies to
measure resolving insolvency. The data describing re-
solving insolvency for all 27 countries in our study are
detailed in Table 1.
Insolvency time refers to the average time (in
years) it takes to complete a bankruptcy procedure
within a given country. We expect that a shorter
time for the bankruptcy procedure will be associ-
ated with a higher rate of bankruptcy filings as
well as higher rates of entrepreneurship.
Insolvency cost (percentage of estate) represents the
cost of bankruptcy proceedings, including court fees and
government levies; the fees of insolvency administra-
tors, auctioneers, assessors, and lawyers; and all other
fees and costs. This measure is recorded as a percentage
of the value of the debtor’s estate. We expect a less
costly insolvency procedure will lead to more bankrupt-
cy filings as well as higher rates of entrepreneurship
(Hall 1992).
Recovery rate calculates how many cents on the
dollar claimants (i.e., creditors, tax authorities, and em-
ployees) can recover from an insolvent firm (Berkowitz
and White 2004). We expect a higher rate of recovery
from insolvent firms will increase investors’ confidence
level, which will in turn lead to higher rates of entrepre-
neurship. We included three key explanatory variables
with a one-year time lag in all regression models to
avoid simultaneity bias.
3.3 Control variables
3.3.1 Control variables: individual level
We controlled for a set of individual-level variables
related to one’s propensity to participate in entrepreneur-
ial activities. The age of an individual was measured in
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years. Gender took the value 1 for females and 0 for
males. Education took the values 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for
individuals who received no education, primary educa-
tion, secondary education, post-secondary education,
and graduate education, respectively.Household income
took values of 1, 2, and 3 for the lowest, middle, and
highest income tiers in the population, respectively.
Fear of failure indicated whether fear of failure would
prevent the individual from setting up a business (1 =
yes). Familiarity ties with entrepreneurs indicated
whether the individual knew other people who had
started a business in the past 2 years (1 = yes). Entrepre-
neurial knowledge and skills indicated whether the in-
dividual perceived that he or she had the required skills
and knowledge to start a new business (1 = yes).
3.3.2 Control variables: country level
We introduced several macro-economic factors associ-
ated with entrepreneurial activities into the models as
control variables as research has shown that these fac-
tors significantly impact the nature of entrepreneurial
activity (Van Stel et al. 2005). Because a country’s
wealth has been shown to influence the prevalence of
entrepreneurial activity, we controlled for the country’s
GDP per capita (USD) adjusted for purchasing power
parity (PPP), as well as the annual GDP growth rate
(Levie and Autio 2011). We controlled for population
size in the model as it captures the size of the potential
domestic market (Autio et al. 2013). Ease of doing
business in a country was accounted for in the model
as it captures legal and bureaucratic barriers in terms of
time, cost, and procedures that entrepreneurs have to
bear when starting a business (Van Stel et al. 2007).
These data were taken from the World Bank datasets.
We included all country-level control variables with a 1-
year time lag in all regression models to establish a clear
causality inference.
4 Analyses
All 27 countries are included for each of the years in the
2004–2010 period. The descriptive data and correlations
for all years in the study are provided in Tables 2 and 3.
We noted low to moderately high correlations between
the three insolvency measures, so we introduced these
measures separately in all regressions.
The data feature a hierarchical structure at multiple
levels, meaning that individual-level data are nested
within country-level data. With this data structure,
individual-level data are likely to be correlated within
country over time. Ignoring the multilevel structure can
result in violating the assumption of data independence
in traditional multiple regressions, which gives rise to
unreliable estimates (Hofmann et al. 2000). Therefore,
we adopted a multilevel modeling approach to test our
hypotheses and to account for interdependence by cap-
turing residuals at different levels (Bliese et al. 2007).
Table 1 Descriptive data on country-level insolvency measures
(2004–2009)
Country Insolvency
time (year)
Insolvency cost
(% of estate)
Insolvency
recovery rate
(cents on the
dollar)
USA 1.5 7 77.5
Greece 2 9 44.9
Netherlands 1.1 4 85.9
Belgium 0.9 4 86.3
France 1.9 9 46.5
Spain 1.5 15 71.6
Hungary 2 15 37.9
Italy 1.8 22 59.9
Switzerland 3 4 46.8
UK 1 6 85.0
Denmark 2.5 4 73.7
Sweden 2 9 74.6
Norway 0.9 1 89.4
Germany 1.2 6.1 81.2
Mexico 1.8 18 64.8
Chile 3.4 15.3 28.6
Australia 1 8 80.1
New
Zealand
1.3 4 79.4
Japan 0.6 4 92.6
Korea 1.5 4 80.5
Turkey 3.3 15 19.3
Canada 0.8 4 90.1
Ireland 0.4 9 87.7
Iceland 1 4 78.9
Finland 0.9 4 88.1
Slovenia 2 8 44.7
Israel 3 23 51.5
Please note that our analyses of individual-level entrepreneurship
are based on the GEMdata from 2005 to 2010. A 1-year time lag is
applied to the country-level variables from the World Bank data
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Moreover, we are interested in assessing to what extent
country-level insolvency regulations influence individ-
uals’ likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship. Multi-
level modeling provides ways to simultaneously evalu-
ate the impact of factors from different levels and makes
testing cross-level effects possible.
To understand how much variance in the different
types of entrepreneurial activities resided in the country
level, we calculated the intra-class correlation coeffi-
cient (ICC) and carried out likelihood ratio tests to
compare single-level and multilevel model specifica-
tions, respectively. The results indicate that there are
significant country differences in necessity-driven, op-
portunity-driven, innovation-oriented, and growth-
oriented entrepreneurship (11.5, 7, 7, and 6%, respec-
tively). In unreported graphs (available upon request),
we plotted Bcaterpillar^ graphs, which showed signifi-
cant country-level variance for each type of entrepre-
neurial activity between the countries studied. Statistical
comparison of our multilevel models to nested single-
level studies showed that the multilevel models provide
a better fit to the data (LR test: Chi2 with 1 df, p < 0.001).
We adopted multilevel logit regressions with random
intercepts in the empirical model to determine the influ-
ence of insolvency measures on opportunity- and
necessity-driven entrepreneurship (with nascent entre-
preneurship as the baseline model). This provided an
estimate of individuals’ likelihood of engaging in either
necessity- or opportunity-driven entrepreneurship given
specific levels of insolvency procedures in a given
country. The models are specified below, and the regres-
sion results are shown in Tables 4 and 5.
Level 1 equation: Yij = β0j + β1jXij + eij.
The level 1 equation predicts the direct effects (or
betas) of level 1 predictors on level 1 outcomes, where
Yij is the dependent variable for an individual observa-
tion at level 1 (subscript i refers to an individual, sub-
script j refers to the country to which the individual
belongs in the current study). Xij is an individual-level
(level 1) predictor. β0j is the intercept of the dependent
variable in country j (level 2). β1j is the slope for the
relationship in country j between the individual-level
predictor and the dependent variable. eij is the
individual-level residual.
Level 2 equations: β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj + u0j
β1 j ¼ γ10 þ u1 j
The level 2 equations predict the effects (or gammas)
of level 2 predictors on level 1 betas as well as on the
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Necessity-driven entrepreneurs (yes = 1) 291,424 0.01 0.12 0 1
Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs (yes = 1) 291,424 0.06 0.24 0 1
Innovative entrepreneurs (yes = 1) 23,597 0.47 0.50 0 1
Growth-oriented entrepreneurs (yes = 1) 23,597 0.10 0.30 0 1
Insolvency time (year) 291,424 1.56 0.78 0.4 5.6
Insolvency cost (% of estate) 291,424 10.14 5.27 1 23
Insolvency recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 291,424 75.85 18.18 11.96 100
Age 291,424 42.28 12.32 18 64
Gender 291,424 1.50 0.50 1 2
Education 291,424 3.36 1.11 1 5
Income 291,424 2 0.82 1 3
Fear of failure (yes = 1) 291,424 0.40 0.49 0 1
Familiarity ties with entrepreneurs (yes = 1) 291,424 0.38 0.49 0 1
Entrepreneurial knowledge and skills (yes = 1) 291,424 0.51 0.50 0 1
GDP per capita, ppp ($) 291,424 31,589.87 6929.08 12,191.06 61,342
GDP growth 291,424 1.62 3.00 − 8.35 7.23
Size of population (million) 291,424 47.50 50.5 0.30 307
Ease of starting a business 291,424 78.57 11.24 56.21 97.56
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level 1 intercept, where γ00 is the overall intercept,
which is the mean of the intercepts across countries.
Wj is the country-level predictor. γ01 is the slope or main
effect of the country-level predictor. γ10 is the slope or
main effect of the individual-level predictor. Finally, u0j
and u1j are country-level residuals.
Multilevel equation of the current study:
Y ij ¼ γ00þγ01ResolveInsovency j þ γ02GDPj
þ γ03GDPGrowthj þ γ04Population j
þ γ05EasedoBusi j þ γ10Education j
þ γ20Incomeij þ γ30Ageij þ γ40Genderij
þ γ50Educationij þ γ60FearFailij
þ γ70FamiliarityTies
þ γ80EntrepreneurialSkillsij þ u0 j þ eij
We also captured the influence of country-level in-
solvency measures on individuals’ likelihood of engag-
ing in innovation- and growth-oriented entrepreneurship
using the same model specifications discussed above.
However, there might be a sample selection issue at play
since entrepreneurs who want to innovate or grow can
only be observed for individuals who decided to become
an early-stage entrepreneur in the first place. The choice
to be an entrepreneur might be influenced by factors that
also drive individuals to innovate or to have high aspi-
rations for business growth. In this case, the estimation
will be biased unless the selection process is not taken
into consideration (Heckman 1979). For the first stage,
we used Heckman two-stage regressions with multilevel
probit models to estimate the probability that an indi-
vidual will be involved in early-stage entrepreneurship.
For the second stage, we used multilevel logit models to
estimate the probability that an individual will engage in
innovation- or growth-oriented entrepreneurship given
specific levels of insolvency procedures in a given
country.
The first-stage regression estimated the probability
that an individual will engage in early-stage entrepre-
neurial activity assuming that the self-selection process
is influenced by both individual-level and country-level
variables. The regression modeled as a function of indi-
viduals’ gender, age, education, household income, fear
of failure, familiarity ties with other entrepreneurs, and
entrepreneurial knowledge and skills and country-level
GDP per capita, GDP growth, population size, and ease
of doing business. In the selection model, we needed to
include one variable that drives entrepreneurial entry but
does not affect ventures’ innovation or growth aspira-
tions and then exclude this variable from the outcome
model to ensure the model can be identified without
bias. Familiarity ties with other entrepreneurs have been
shown to influence one’s chance of becoming an entre-
preneur (De Soto 2000; Licht and Siegel 2006; Nanda
and Sorensen 2010); however, there has been no theo-
retical or empirical evidence showing they influence
new firms’ innovation or growth aspirations. Therefore,
we included familiarity ties with other entrepreneurs in
the selection model. The regression results are shown in
Table 6.
Outcome model:
Y ij ¼ γ00þγ01ResolveInsovency j þ γ02GDPj
þ γ03GDPGrowthj þ γ04Population j
þ γ05EasedoBusi j þ γ10Education j
þ γ20Incomeij þ γ30Ageij þ γ40Genderij
þ γ50Educationij þ γ60FearFailij
þþγ70EntrepreneurialSkillsij þ γ90imrij þ u0 j
þ eij
In the second stage, we adopted a similar method—
multilevel logit regressions—for the outcome model as
the one we used to estimate opportunity- and necessity-
driven entrepreneurship). Using this method, we esti-
mated the effects of insolvency measures on innovation-
oriented and growth-driven entrepreneurship control-
ling for the inverse Mills ratio computed from the esti-
mation results from the first-stage selection model in
addition to controls for age, gender, education, fear of
failure, GDP (ppp) per capita, GDP growth, population
size, and ease of doing business. The regression results
are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
To test hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, which propose that
the impact of insolvency measures is stronger for pro-
ductive entrepreneurship than it is for unproductive
entrepreneurship, we needed to compare the effects of
three insolvency factors on necessity-driven entrepre-
neurship with those on opportunity-, innovation-, and
growth-driven entrepreneurship. In logistic regressions,
as adopted in the current study, traditional tests of
K. Fu et al.
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coefficient equality across groups do not work the same
way as they do in linear regressions because the depen-
dent variable is scaled differently in eachmodel. In other
words, the regression coefficients among different
models or groups are not directly comparable. Long
(2009) showed that tests of equality for predicted prob-
abilities in such models can be used for group compar-
isons. Long (2009) also demonstrated that testing the
equality of predicted probabilities requires multiple tests
since group differences in predictions vary with the
levels of the variables in the model.
To facilitate interpretation of economically meaning-
ful effects, we computed average marginal effects
(AMEs) for all the independent variables. The effects
are now interpreted in the measure of probability rather
than as the odds ratio as shown in the models’ raw
coefficient. For continuous variables, such as insolvency
time, cost, and recovery rate in the current study, the
AMEs are the instantaneous rate of change for those
variables of interest. It is more intuitive and informative
to show the predictivemargins over a set of values of the
variables of interest as the effects of a predictor on the
dependent variable in a nonlinear model vary based on
the values of all other variables included in the model.
We thus calculated the predicted probability of the four
groups of entrepreneurship over a set of observed values
for insolvency time, cost, and recovery rate and present
the results graphically in the results section.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the average value of insolvencymeasures
across 6 years in the 27 OECD countries included in our
sample. Chile is the most inefficient country in terms of
insolvency time; it takes more than 3 years to resolve
insolvency in this country. In comparison, it takes less
than 5 months in Ireland. In most countries, insolvent
entrepreneurs need about 1 to 2 years to resolve insol-
vency. Norway has the lowest insolvency recovery cost
(1% of estate), whereas Israel has the highest (23% of
estate) followed by Italy (22% of estate). Insolvency
recovery rate is rather high in Japan and Canada, both
of which prescribe that 90 cents on the dollar can be
recovered. Turkey and Chile are on the lower end, with
less than 30 cents on the dollar recoverable by secured
creditors through reorganization, liquidation, or debt-
enforcement proceedings.Ta
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Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for all the
predictors and controls used. Table 3 shows the correla-
tion matrix for the individual-level variables and
country-level controls and predictors. To check for
multicollinearity, we computed the variance inflation
factors (VIFs) and tolerance values for all variables in
our model (available upon request). VIF values greater
than 10 or tolerance values less than 0.10 indicate rea-
sons for concern due to collinearity among variables.
We found low to moderate VIF values between 1.04 and
4.02, which indicates that the models are not tainted by
multicollinearity.
Overall, we find that insolvency measures have
strong effects on individuals’ likelihood of engaging in
various types of entrepreneurship. The results are rather
consistent, except for growth-oriented entrepreneurship.
As expected, the insolvency time and insolvency cost
(percentage of estate) are negatively related to individ-
uals’ likelihood of engaging in opportunity-driven, ne-
cessity-driven, and innovation-oriented entrepreneur-
ship. The insolvency recovery rate has, as expected, a
positive effect on opportunity-driven and innovation-
oriented entrepreneurship but has no impact on
necessity-driven entrepreneurial activities. Marginal ef-
fects confirm that the proposed effects are stronger for
productive entrepreneurship than for unproductive
entrepreneurship.
To our surprise, the effects of insolvency regulations
on individuals’ likelihood of engaging in growth-
oriented entrepreneurship are rather counterintuitive at
first glance. Insolvency time has a marginally positive
effect on growth-oriented entrepreneurship, whereas in-
solvency recovery rate has a marginally negative effect,
but it is hardly significant. Insolvency cost shows no
impact.
For necessity-driven entrepreneurship, insolvency
time is negatively related to individuals’ likelihood of
engaging in necessity-driven entrepreneurship. Specifi-
cally, when all other variables are held constant at their
observed values, the average marginal effects of a one-
unit increase in insolvency time decrease the likelihood
that an individual will engage in necessity-driven entre-
preneurship by 0.1% (− 0.001, p < 0.05). We also find
that insolvency cost (percent of estate) is negatively
associated with the likelihood of engaging in
necessity-driven entrepreneurship. Specifically, when
all other variables are held constant at their observed
values, the average marginal effects of a one-unit in-
crease in insolvency cost decrease the likelihood that an
individual will engage in necessity-driven entrepreneur-
ship by 0.4% (− 0.004, p < 0.01). Insolvency recovery
rate has no impact on individuals’ likelihood of engag-
ing in necessity-driven entrepreneurship. These effects
are described in detail in Table 4.
For opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, we find
stronger overall effects of the three World Bank insol-
vency legislation measures compared with necessity-
driven entrepreneurship. First, insolvency time is
strongly negatively related to individuals’ likelihood of
engaging in opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. Spe-
cifically, when all other variables are held constant at
their observed values, the average marginal effects of a
1-unit increase in insolvency time decrease the likeli-
hood that an individual will engage in opportunity-
driven entrepreneurship by 0.5% (− 0.005, p < 0.001).
We also find that insolvency cost (percentage of estate)
is strongly negatively associated with the likelihood of
engaging in opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. Spe-
cifically, when all other variables are held constant at
their observed values, on average, the marginal effect of
a 1-unit increase in insolvency cost decreases the likeli-
hood that an individual will engage in opportunity-
driven entrepreneurship by 1% (− 0.01, p < 0.001). This
effect is actually quite substantial. Insolvency recovery
rate is strongly positively associated with individuals’
likelihood of engaging in opportunity-driven entrepre-
neurship. A 1-unit increase in insolvency recovery rate
will lead to a 1.5% (0.015, p < 0.001) increase in the
probability that an individual will engage in
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. These effects are
described in detail in Table 5.
For innovative entrepreneurship based on new prod-
ucts, we find a markedly stronger negative effect for
insolvency time (year) and cost on individuals’ likeli-
hood of engaging in innovation-oriented entrepreneur-
ship. Specifically, when all other variables are held
constant at their observed values, the average marginal
effect of a 1-unit increase in insolvency time decrease
the likelihood that an individual will engage in
innovation-oriented entrepreneurship by 12.1% (−
0.121, p < 0.001), a substantial effect. The variable in-
solvency cost (% of estate) shows a similarly strong
negative impact (− 0.12, p < 0.001) on the individuals’
likelihood of engaging in innovation-oriented entrepre-
neurship. Insolvency recovery rate is strongly positively
associated with individuals’ likelihood of engaging in
innovation-oriented entrepreneurship. A 1-unit increase
in insolvency recovery rate increases the probability that
Productive entrepreneurship and the effectiveness of insolvency legislation: a cross-country study
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an individual will engage in innovation-oriented entre-
preneurship by 18.6% (0.186, p < 0.001). These effects
are described in detail in Table 7.
For growth-oriented entrepreneurship, we find
somewhat differing effects compared with the first three
types of entrepreneurship. First, insolvency time has a
small and weak positive impact on the individual-level
entry of growth-oriented entrepreneurs. When all other
variables are held constant at their observed values, the
average marginal effects of a 1-unit increase in insol-
vency time increase the likelihood that an individual will
engage in growth-oriented entrepreneurship by 0.7%
(0.01, p < 0.1). Insolvency cost has no impact on the
likelihood of engaging in growth-oriented entrepreneur-
ship. However, insolvency recovery rate is weakly neg-
atively associated with individuals’ likelihood of engag-
ing in growth-oriented entrepreneurship. A 1-unit in-
crease in insolvency recovery rate will reduce the prob-
ability that an individual will engage in growth-oriented
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Table 6 Multilevel probit regression on individual-level likeli-
hood of engaging in early-stage entrepreneurship (selection
model)
Early-stage entrepreneurship
Age − 0.008*** (0.000)
Gender (female = 1) − 0.115*** (0.008)
Education 1 (some secondary) 0.032 (0.032)
Education 2 (secondary) 0.043 (0.032)
Education 3 (post-secondary) 0.057**** (0.032)
Education 4 (graduate experience) 0.116*** (0.032)
Income 1 (middle tier) 0.022* (0.010)
Income 2 (top tier) 0.052*** (0.010)
Fear of failure (yes = 1) − 0.236*** (0.008)
Familiarity ties with
entrepreneurs (yes = 1)
0.349*** (0.008)
Entrepreneurial knowledge
and skills (yes = 1)
0.890*** (0.009)
GDP per capita, ppp ($) 0.126**** (0.069)
GDP growth 0.023*** (0.002)
Size of population − 0.030 (0.030)
Ease of starting a business − 0.004** (0.001)
Constant − 2.196** (0.835)
Level-2 variance (SD) 0.051*** (0.015)
Observations 291,424
Number of groups 27
Log likelihood − 70,045.322
Note: Standard errors clustered on the country level in parentheses
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; ****p < 0.10
Productive entrepreneurship and the effectiveness of insolvency legislation: a cross-country study
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entrepreneurship by 1.3% (− 0.013, p < 0. 1). These
effects are described in detail in Table 8.
We plotted and compared the predicted probability of
insolvency measures on productive and unproductive
entrepreneurial activities across a set of values for the
insolvency measures to show differences in the impact
of these measures on the four types of entrepreneurship.
We decided to remove these figures as there was no
dramatic deviation in the predicted probabilities of the
predictors from the mean value of the marginal effects.
The average marginal effect reflects the true relationship
between the predictors and the outcome variables. The
figures are available upon request.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The Flash Eurobarometer Entrepreneurship Survey
(European Commission 2004) suggested that the risk
of bankruptcy is one of the most significant reasons that
individuals choose not to engage in entrepreneurship.
However, the perceived risk of bankruptcy differs sig-
nificantly across nations. In this paper, we presented a
comparative study on the association between insolven-
cy regulations and individuals’ likelihood of engaging
in entrepreneurship in 27 countries. We recognized the
heterogeneity of entrepreneurship, distinguished be-
tween unproductive and productive entrepreneurial ac-
tivities, and conducted a multilevel analysis of the rela-
tionship between three different measures of resolving
insolvency from the World Bank (2004–2009) and four
different measures of entrepreneurship from the GEM
(i.e., opportunity-, necessity-, innovation-, and growth-
driven entrepreneurship).
Our analyses show that reducing Bbarriers to failure^
may indeed stimulate entrepreneurship but to a different
extent depending on the nature of the entrepreneurship
undertaken. However, the effects of our three World
Bank insolvency legislation measures differ across the
estimates obtained. The World Bank measures of in-
solvency time, insolvency cost (percentage of estate),
and recovery rate showed expected influences on
opportunity-, necessity-, and innovation-oriented en-
trepreneurship. Time and cost are negatively associ-
ated with entrepreneurship, whereas recovery rate is
positively related to entrepreneurship. Further, the
effect is markedly stronger for opportunity- and
innovation-oriented entrepreneurship than it is for
necessity-driven entrepreneurship.Ta
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Conversely, the impact of the measures on growth-
oriented entrepreneurship was rather surprising. Insol-
vency time is weakly positively related to growth-
oriented entrepreneurship, whereas insolvency recovery
rate has weak negative effects. One possible reason for
these divergent results for growth-oriented entrepreneur-
ship could be that growth-oriented entrepreneurship in
the GEM is measured using the forecasted number of
employees, not financial measures, such as turnover or
profits. Many innovation- and opportunity-driven entre-
preneurs do not envision hiring many employees, but
entrepreneurs in personnel-intensive but low-risk busi-
nesses, such as retail or personal services, may foresee
hiring more people (Delmar and Wiklund 2008).
Opportunity- and innovation-oriented entrepreneurship
tend to involve higher risks of failure compared with
growth-oriented entrepreneurship since the former in-
volve higher market uncertainty as they seek to turn new
ideas into marketable products and services (Low and
Weiler 2012). For growth-oriented entrepreneurship, on
the other hand, market uncertainty is generally lower
since most entrepreneurs in this category expect to em-
ploy at least five employees within a five-year period.
Related findings were corroborated in a recent study
by Estrin et al. (2016), who analyzed how specific
components of bankruptcy laws affect the risk percep-
tions of 255,275 potential entrepreneurs in 15 OECD
countries using a subset of the data employed in the
current paper. The authors’ found that elements of per-
sonal and corporate bankruptcy law that negatively af-
fect growth-oriented entrepreneurship were those ele-
ments that leave debtors with less protection over their
assets and decision rights during and after bankruptcy.
This finding offers an explanation as to why insolvency
legislation in general may impact opportunity- and
innovation-oriented entrepreneurship differently than
growth-oriented entrepreneurship. To close a business
with ease or have a Bfresh start^ is thus arguably more
relevant and inviting for opportunity- and innovation-
oriented entrepreneurship than for growth-oriented en-
trepreneurship (Ayotte 2007). For entrepreneurs who
primarily aspire to achieve rapid employment growth,
other institutional mechanisms beyond insolvency leg-
islation appear to be more important (Estrin et al. 2013).
These findings suggest that insolvency legislation is
indeed related to entrepreneurial activities at the indi-
vidual level, and these impacts differ in both nature and
magnitude for productive and unproductive entrepre-
neurship. Our results contribute to research by showingTa
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that entrepreneurship is heterogeneous and is affected
by institutional constraints, specifically insolvency laws,
in different ways (Lee et al. 2011; Estrin et al. 2016).
Our analyses suggest that while reducing barriers to
failure can stimulate opportunity- and innovation-
oriented entrepreneurship, it does not necessarily affect
growth-oriented entrepreneurship undertaken by entre-
preneurs seeking to expand organically by hiring others.
These findings support and extend findings from the
quasi-natural experimental study by Eberhart et al.
(2016) in Japan by suggesting that more forgiving in-
solvency rules and regulations do in fact encourage
better not just more entrepreneurship.
Overall, the analyses in this paper provide authorities
food for thought, suggesting they consider balanced
insolvency laws and regulations that take the societal
costs of entrepreneurial failure into account. Compared
with the null hypothesis of no changes in legislation, or
the costs and benefits of alternative changes in rules and
regulations related to entrepreneurship, considering
more moderate insolvency rules and regulations does
in fact encourage more productive—not just more—
entrepreneurship.
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